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Agrootics. 
A semiotic cubic 
model description for 
meaning interpretation
Semiotics has meaning models that constitute forms of 
observation of reality’s phenomenology. At current per-
spective of human reasoning, those models are insuffi-
cient reality interpreters before society and to the tech-
nology that accompanies it. In terms of meaning models of 
analysis in semiotics, it can be resumed as so:  Saussure’s 
dichotomy (a binary model), Peirce, Ogden-Richards and 
Morris’ trichotomies (a triadic model) and Greimas’ square 
(a tetradic model). As we inhabit a three-dimensional re-
ality, we assume that everything can be measured and 
observed in terms of distance and extension relativities, 
as to an emotion, a phenomenon, a social medium or an 
object. Thus, we propose an alternative meaning produc-
tion and interpretation, through a conceptual cubic mod-
el rooted on Peirce’s trichotomy. This cubic perspective, 
represented by the development of a perception emula-
tor in form of a cube, will be grounded through sensibility 
of social and physical space notions.
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1. Introduction
Semiotics has meaning models that constitute forms of 
observation of reality´s phenomenology. By the presented 
perspective of human reasoning, those models are insuf-
ficient reality interpreters before society and the techno-
logy that accompanies it. In terms of meaning models of 
analysis in semiotics, it can be resumed as so:  Saussure’s 
dichotomy (a binary model), Peirce, Ogden-Richards and 
Morris’ trichotomies (a triadic model) and the Greimas’ 
square (a tetradic model). This study will introduce the 
basis for an alternative meaning production and interpre-
tation, through a conceptual cubic model rooted on Pei-
rce’s trichotomy. This cubic perspective, represented by 
the development of a perception emulator in the form of 
a cube, will be grounded in the sensibility of space social 
and physical notions. As we inhabit a three-dimensional 
reality, we assume that everything can be measured and 
observed in terms of distance and extension relativities, 
as to an emotion, a phenomenon, a social medium or an 
object. In any case, there always will be implicit an idea of 
spatial relationship of something to something. With the 
objective of researching another process of the meaning 
interpretation, we provide an imagetic reasoning conveyor 
relating philosophical, physical and digital reality construc-
tion in its augmented or simple form.
2. Dimensions sensibilities
For being part of a three-dimensional environment, three 
variables, which define three axes, are implied. And those 
we indicate has the event, space and time. Because their 
accountability it’s required, we will develop and justify their 
aspects of importance, namely time and space. Time can 
be considered the mental perception outcome from the 
perceived change between each object relative referenc-
es. By Kant’s perspective and his transcendental idealism, 
the way we perceive depends on the intuition we appre-
hend from objects, considering time a sensitivity, not an 
object, but a change of relationship perception between 
objects. In Kant’s own words, “sensations are the products 
of our sensibility, and space and time are the forms of our 
sensibility.” (Carus, 1892) Time, due to its relation with 
a space variable, may assume an inherent perception of 
its spatial nature, reflecting itself through in a dimension 
that occupies a type of space. Internal relational relativity 
movement between its dimension’s components and its 
binding continuous overlapping transformations will pro-
duce a mental perception of a transformative continuity 
which translates into the designation of ‘time’. For Kant, 
time is a “subjective condition of our intuition, and the in-
dividual itself is not outside.” (Kant, 2001, p. 74) Mind’s ac-
tivity time dependence, in the building blocks of its imagi-
nary, is a precursor to its physical neuronal activity added 
by its lag or its reality effectiveness apparent perception.
Cognitive scientist Mario Bonato in his article, “When time 
is space: Evidence for a mental timeline” (2012), states 
that “recently, several lines of evidence have suggested 
that the mental representation of time might be spatial in 
nature.” Ultimately all phenomenon is nonetheless a local-
ity or a non-locality. David Hume, as also Émile Durkheim, 
from their perspective assumed that “ideas of space and 
time are therefore not separate or distinct ideas; are only 
ideas of the manner or order in which objects exist; or, 
in other words, a vacuum or extension without matter is 
impossible to conceive of, or a time where no succession 
or change exist in any real existence.” (Hume, 2001, p. 72)
Edward T. Hall, in the chapter “Space Speaks” of his work 
“The Silent Language” (Hall, 1990b), tells us that “literally 
thousands of experiments teach us unconsciously that 
space communicates,” (Hall, 1990b, p. 161) and through 
personal experience that “we visualize the relationship be-
tween places we know,” (id., p. 163) where possibly the 
relationship with space it’s the “guarantee of particular 
identities.” (Silvano, 2010, p. 71) Object ‘space’ commu-
nicates itself penetrating into the environment through 
which it passes. Elliot Gaines, president of the Semiotic 
Society of America (in 2014), wrote in his article, “Commu-
nication and the Semiotics of Space” (Gaines, 2006), that 
the “study of space as a semiotic phenomenon suggests 
that the meaning of space, as a sign, is generally under-
stood in relation to other concerns. Communication draws 
attention to the content of messages while space contri-
butes to the meanings of those messages without being 
obvious about its role in constructing meaning.” (Gaines, 
2006) Gaines also argued that when “we observe space 
as a sign, new ways of understanding are possible, and the 
meanings of things can be discussed as they pertain to our 
everyday lives.” (id.) From now on, we also start to look 
to the emptyness as an object, which retains a shape and 
assumes a sign of what is not there, or what we do not 
perceive.
Different societies have an ecological heritage concept 
of space, on one hand the West generally builds space 
defining characteristics of extremes (external, as lines, or 
internal, as points), on other hand, they do not have the 
same reference or give more importance to central or 
internal area of what they consider the place of “space.” 
Hall, writing about space standards in “The Silent Lan-
guage”, pointed out that from the point of view of society, 
to which we belong, the “concept of space makes use of 
the edges of things. If there aren’t any edges, we make 
them by creating artificial lines (five miles west and two 
miles north).” (Hall, 1990b, p. 174) Later sociologist de Ker-
ckhove (1997) mentioned the significance of Hall’s work 
referencing certain ‘space’ cultures to an “area or empty 
places” (id.), for others refers to “complex network of rela-
tionships between people and objects.” (id.) Individual and 
social structure of space are constituted by the relation of 
objects central points that populate it, but more distant 
the relationship between these points are, wider the terri-
tory reaches, thus defined into to its space.
In terms of social morphology, it can be considered the 
existence of “a relationship between human communities, 
the space they inhabit and their individual communities.” 
(Silvano, 2010, p. 52) In this sense, to accept space as an 
understanding, that does not has expression beyond peo-
ple’s behavior, sociologist Raymond Ledrut (id.), discussing 
urban semiotics in “Espace et sociétés” (1980), ponders 
that space is a produced form and concluded that is “im-
possible to consider spaces separately, their representa-
tions and social personalities. They are in constant interac-
tion.” (Silvano, 2010, p. 54)
Le Corbusier, in its 1945’s “L’Espace Indicible”, expressed 
his notion’s view of space in such manner: “Taking posses-
sion of space is the first gesture of living things, men and 
animals, plants and clouds, a fundamental manifestation 
of balance and permanence. First evidence of an entity is 
the occupation of space.” (Le Corbusier, 2010, p. 48) We 
are the ones who occupy space, who create it, who use 
it, but is our choice to see it and so perceive it as an en-
tity in which we transcend and extend as far and freely 
as possible. Individual and personal interpretation of how 
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a person sees space, or how she feels and relates to it, is 
influenced by social and mental spaces that experienced 
throughout her life. Reading stories, that put us into imagi-
nary creation, and scenarios visualization or other worlds 
on television or in a movie theater, momentarily extend 
our vision and therefore our image space. In an article 
on social morphology and its collective representations, 
Jean Rémy around 1991, rambling about the thought of 
Durkheim, summarized space problem construction and 
interpretation as follows: “Space’s notion, in Durkheim, 
puts the relationship problem between spatial morpho-
logy - that is, objective or material plan – and symbolic 
social – that is, subjective or cultural plan – implemented 
in collective representations or in societies holiness. Thus, 
social space it’s at the interface between materials causali-
ties on one hand, and functional relations, on the other.” 
(Silvano, 2010, p. 18)
Space’s notion is produced by interpreting an a priori 
state presented to us and transmitted throughout life by 
proprioceptive bodily sentience, where its mental cons-
truct materially depends on limited visual and auditory 
borders, resuming and delimiting into a volume perceived 
and embraced as a limited whole. Our relationship with 
space is what defines us, on our relativity to it and how 
we use it, whatever its dimension. To Raymond Ledrut, as 
mentioned in his work “L’homme et l’espace” (published 
in 1990), “space is for us the expression of our collective 
possibilities: symbolizes the power of man, is at the same 
time the sign and the instrument of an infinite capacity.” 
(Silvano, 2010, p. 55) Space is quite possibly our last fron-
tier. Bearing this statement in mind, giving the words of 
John F. Kennedy an adapted intention in applying the con-
cept of ‘space’, we can say that “exploration of space will 
go ahead, whether we join in it or not, and it is one of the 
great adventures of all time.” (Moon Speech, 12th Septem-
ber 1962)
3. Mind’s space assimilation
We have, as a guarantee, space perception and the pre-
sence of it, nevertheless, we do not have a concrete sensa-
tion. Perhaps this could be the sensory sense that is lac-
king us to develop, to whom we have been unconsciously 
building through “material devices that allow the interac-
tion between the world of digital information and ordinary 
world.” (Lévy, 1999) In that direction, technology also in-
vites the mind to absorb spaces, virtual or not, in digitally 
social simulations. Mind flows and adapts, adjusting to 
the demands of the various environments, to which it’s 
submitted, finding in each of them its own identity, or the 
empathic part which reflects it, thus simulating the con-
venience of its existence in the universe in which it ma-
terializes. Without really knowing we live in many worlds 
within the same dimension where we simulate various 
ways of living and being, reserving our inner original state, 
our thing-in-itself to spaces and people that are closest, 
and especially for ourselves. Inclusively, to whom partici-
pates nowadays in a technological society, the penetra-
tion of information is such that the mind unconsciously is 
forced to respond to a multitude of scenarios with which it 
confronts. In its “Doors of Perception” (1st edition in 1954), 
Aldous Huxley noted that “the mind perceives things in 
terms of intensity’s existence, depth of meaning, of rela-
tionships within a pattern.” (Huxley, 2008, p. 41) In overall, 
Walter Jackson Freeman, biologist and theoretical neuro-
scientist, in his study of the neurobiological explanation 
of meaning production (Freeman, 2000, 2004), said that 
regarding the stipulation of mental sense “brains obtain 
information about the world through the consequences of 
their own embodied actions. Information thus obtained is 
used in constructing meaning and is then discarded.” (Free-
man, 2000) Mind can not be an independent substance of 
the brain, at least mind becomes inherent to it, but also it 
may not be a physicality of the brain. Interpretation of the 
object ‘information’ is constructed and made available by 
the mind, leaving us the responsibility to observe it and 
give it the meaning that we understand or comprehend 
to use. Understanding an information, or a person’s rea-
soning with whom we communicate, passes primarily by 
the understanding of the sign that expresses and mediates 
the use to establish reason or information. These cogni-
tion extenders or world mediators, signs, are the bridges 
that set comprehensions. But the mind doesn’t act alone, 
it expresses in dimension using the respective body as an 
adaptation to the surrounding environment.
4. Body’s space adaptation
Body. According to Lorna Marshall, a professor of body 
expression at the Royal Academy of Dramatic Art, body 
presents itself as “the sole mediator of human experi-
ence,” (Marshall, 2001, p. xii) the one that remains at the 
center of a constant exchange between the mind and the 
object, becoming it a channel, the “core of all communica-
tion from the human world-real.” (id.) Besides this direct 
connection we have, through technological devices at the 
body-space border, a connection by the intrusion, which 
implies a material connection to a device or “prosthesis”, 
and also a connection by mediation, overtaken by mobile 
and other smart devices. These objects provide our body 
affordances that combine, extend and increase the possi-
ble affordances to us. Concept of affordance came by the 
hand of psychologist James Gibson’s work of 1979 (Gib-
son, 1986). According to Joel Norman (2002), psycholo-
gist L.S. Mark in a 1987 article defined the ‘affordance’ 
concept as “the functional utility of certain environmental 
objects or object complexes taken with reference to indi-
viduals and their action capabilities.” (Norman, 2002) For 
anthropologist Paul Kockelman an affordance is observed 
as a “semiotic process whose sign is a natural feature, 
whose object is a purchase, and whose key interpretant 
is an action that heeds that feature, or an instrument that 
incorporates that feature.” (Kockelman, 2013)
With a bodily organic concept in mind, following Aristo-
tle, Leibniz and Kierkegaard, Bártolo observed that the 
“body appears to us as an interface, an interface between 
me and the world, as my place in the world.” (Bártolo, 
2007, pp. 184-185) On the threshold of the interface’s 
space, of the body with the biosphere, we consider that 
smart technology (smartphones, ipads, tablets, multi-
touch screens, laptops) will produce the extension of 
communication to information located in other realities, 
or through other realities, having in mind that “our tech-
nologies are today a frontier where its played the possi-
bility of delimiting the humane.” (Martins, 2011) Ponders 
Bártolo that “one could consider the technology that af-
fects the body it’s, essentially, a technological semiotics 
that transforms and extends the body senses, the body 
meanings, at the same time that reverses and intensifies, 
onto the body, the signifier and signified statutes.” (Bár-
tolo, 2007, p. 218) Kerckhove goes further stating that “it 
is not the interface that invades the body, it’s the spirit 
that turns into its own interface.” (de Kerckhove, 1998, 
p. 67)
According to Bártolo, Roy Ellen in his “Anatomical classi-
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fication and the semiotics of the body” (written in 1977) 
presented some impressions of ‘semiotics of the body’. In 
his opinion the body is not only the interpreter’s cocoon 
but also that which gives meaning where this semiotics 
“seeks to describe ‘the different forms whose bodily con-
tinuum is segmented and organized in part by the diffe-
rent languages of the world’,” (Bártolo, 2007, p. 171) this 
way the “body would form a semiotic continuum hardly 
interruptible, because the body itself is a ‘driver’ of mea-
ning, making the meaning slippery.” (id.) Having support 
on Jacques Fontanille, “in his interpretation of his own 
body as enveloppe sensible” (Bártolo, 2007, p. 94), Bártolo 
argues that the body “is neither the casing (l’enveloppe) 
nor the air is its content” (id.), but both. Latter Fontanille 
(2011), in its “Corps et Sens”, would write about the “en-
veloppe corporelle”. While “l’envelope” indicates a repre-
sentation of a frontier, Bourdieu’s habitus would represent 
an experience accumulation of its memories. As stated in 
Bourdieu, “habitus is a set of dispositions that lead agents 
to act and to react in certain ways. The provisions gener-
ate practices, perceptions and attitudes that are “regular” 
without being consciously coordinated or governed by 
any ‘rule’.” (Bourdieu, 1996, p. 13, note 43) Habitus con-
tributes to action of the acting body and to “determining 
what transforms it.” (Bourdieu, 1998) We are the exten-
sion of what we want to be, we are the limit of what we 
see, we are our own frontier. At a time when technology 
was not so evolved, de Kerckhove saw for a fact that it was 
“happening something like a reversal of the relationship 
between man and machine. Previously it was very easy to 
say that technology was an extension of the body, but it 
became less comfortable to say that the body has trans-
formed into an extension of technology. However, we 
can not ignore what is happening, and that is because the 
body is increasingly distributed in space, reaching a point 
where the balance between what is “out there” and what 
is “in here” bursts itself.” (de Kerckhove, 1998, p. 93)
Sensations are experiences, that belong to the Embodied 
Mind’s philosophical space, representing human mind’s 
nature relation with the human body’s shape, in which 
aspects of cognition are recreated by the body. This con-
cept comes from Kant extending itself into Merleau-Ponty 
(in “Phenomenology of Perception”, 1945) and Francisco 
Varela (in “The Embodied Mind”, 1991). As addressed by 
psychologist Margaret L. Wilson, the “emerging viewpoint 
of embodied cognition holds that cognitive processes are 
deeply rooted in the body’s interactions with the world.” 
(Wilson, 2002) Psychologist Anna M. Borghi adds that 
“Embodied Cognition underlines that cognition is con-
strained by the kind of body we possess, (…) the body is 
always considered as an acting body.” (Borghi & Cimatti, 
2010) Borghi and Cimatti proposed to extend this philoso-
phy of mind from direct involvement of the body in actions 
directed to objectives, considering the internal language, 
having, on one hand, a contribution “to form a unitary 
sense of our body” (id.), and another remodeling on how 
“we implicitly perceive our own body.” (id.)
Is of importance the body’s own perception in the context 
of an understanding of what the mind is, and its relation to 
the body and subsequently with the object, namely its re-
lationship with space. Today what is done in this direction? 
In agreement with Ken Robinson, who in 1998 led the ad-
visory committee of the British government in creativity, 
culture and education (“All Our Futures: Creativity, Culture 
and Education”), there is almost no “education system on 
the planet that teaches dance everyday to children the 
way we teach them mathematics. Why? Why not? I think 
this is rather important.” (Robinson, 2006) This is important 
because it generates plasticity to the brain structure and 
processing, strengthening the synaptic connections, gi-
ving the mind the sense and notion of space, and also the 
limbs presence as body trunk extension. (Caroni, Donato, 
& Muller, 2012; Giguere, 2011; Lövdén, Wenger, Mårtens-
son, Lindenberger, & Bäckman, 2013; Phillips-Silver, 2009; 
Sevdalis & Keller, 2011) In the end, our body extends the 
expression of ourselves and our minds interpretations.
5. Frontier transcendence
Transitions, such as the mind/body or body/object fron-
tier, are places of transformation, evolution or revolution, 
of the threshold between parallel and different realities, 
between real and simulated spaces, between a priori uni-
verses simulacra. At this place, technology enters to as-
sume an intermediary role objective, as in the opinion of 
Edward Hall, “technology is an inevitable result of man-
kind’s propensity to evolve outside his body.” (Hall, 1989, 
p. 9) Through this interface, humanity transcends beyond 
the limitations of its body shape and extends its own ex-
perience. Thus we agree with Aldous Huxley’s statement, 
in its “The Doors of Perception”, in which the author ex-
pressed its feelings that “the urge to transcend the self-
conscious of itself is one of the appetites of the soul.” 
(Huxley, 2008, p. 74) Something that is transcendent we 
will take as what the reason still did not create a sense, or 
which is at the boundaries of personal space concept, out-
side the physical environment, which transcends us, which 
extends us.
Philosopher Zoe Drayson, who was part of a broad Euro-
pean project on awareness, describes that in the hypo-
thesis of extended cognition (HEC) “cognitive processes 
can and extend to the outside of the head, and that the 
elements of the world around us can really become part 
of our cognitive systems.” (Drayson, 2010) Following this 
line of thought philosopher and cognitivist Michele Me-
rritt also wrote about this confrontation with the concept 
of extended cognition observing that “cognitive processes 
are not entirely organism-bound and can extend into the 
world.” (Merritt, 2011) Extended Mind’s concept was de-
veloped in an article authored by philosophers Andy Clark 
and David Chalmers (1998) where they presented the idea 
of active externalism. This concept, related to the field of 
philosophy of mind, is based on the idea that the scope of 
the mind do not need to end within the limits of the skin 
and skull, promoting the view that objects in extracorpor-
eal space are used by mind, in a way objects can be viewed 
as extensions of its own mind. As in the case argued by 
David Ludwig in “Extended Cognition and the explosion 
of knowledge” (Ludwig, 2014), which states that “active 
externalism has to accept that the information resources 
such as Wikipedia and Google constitute extended cogni-
tive processes.” (id.)
With transcendence, being a state beyond the reach of 
physical perception, an a priori state is considered. Kant 
remarked the ‘transcendent’ term as all that “goes beyond” 
(Kant, 2001), and “transcendental to all knowledge which 
generally occupies less of objects (...) to the extent that 
it should be possible a priori.” (Kant, 2001, p. 53) A tran-
sitional place will always be premonitory of an overcom-
ing process of something a priori out of range or beyond 
normality. Interpretation and significance of this fine line 
between mind and body is supported by Semiotics, as one 
can be seen in the thought of Magariños (2008), as well as 
by an observation of Juri Lotman in which he stated that 
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one of the “fundamental concepts of semiotic delimitation 
lies in the notion of boundary” (Lotman & Clark, 2005) as 
the “border of semiotic space is the most important func-
tional and structural position, giving substance to its semi-
otic mechanism.” (id.) In summary, according to Kerckhove, 
“the most important psychologic change can be the exter-
nalization of our common personal conscience, even if we 
start to explore the outer tactile perceptions through long 
processes from thought. The outside world will become 
an extension of consciousness, as used to happen with 
“primitive” cultures.” (de Kerckhove, 1997, pp. 85-86) We 
manifest our own inside border of mind/body on projec-
tions into the outside world, firstly locally on the transition 
from body to space.
6. Semiotic continuum space
Lotman claims, to describe the conceptual representation 
of semiosphere, that the whole culture is “immersed in a 
semiotic space” (Lotman & Uspensky, 1978) and that indi-
viduals within a given culture “can only function by inter-
action with that space” (id.) through signs. As Vyacheslav 
Ivanov, a prominent philologist and one of the founders 
of the Semiotics of Culture in the School Tartu-Moscow, 
said in 1998: “the task of Semiotics is the description of 
the semiosphere without which the noosphere is inconcei-
vable.” (Torop, 2005) For Peeter Torop, “Ivanov’s statement 
clearly is based on interdisciplinary logic with the term 
“semiosphere” placed between biosphere and noosphere.” 
(id.) Juri Lotman created the concept of semiosphere in 
1982 as the semiotic space in which the signic processes 
operate in the set of all umwelten. The use of the term um-
welt in Semiotics began with the reading of the linguist 
and semiotician Thomas Sebeok of Jakob von Uexküll’s 
work, a biologist who studied the areas of muscle physi-
ology, animal behavior and cybernetic life. Umwelt is a 
concept close to semiosphere, which unites all semiotic 
processes of an organism as a whole. Thus in a biologi-
cal perspective, there is an umwelt body and umwelten of 
cells, where we can also observe their relations. Therefore, 
the semiosphere is considered an ensemble of all intercon-
nected umwelten.
States Kaie Kotov, researcher of Semiotics ecology and 
multimedia communication, that was Lotman who formu-
lated the “definition of a semiosphere as a “semiotic con-
tinuum”, a heterogeneous space, enclosed in itself, that 
is in constant interaction with other similar structures” 
(Kotov, 2002), where the “contact points between diffe-
rent systems enable the emergence of new meaning” (id.), 
which is “characterized by a specific structure of space 
and time, whose organization is established through the 
workings of semiosphere itself.” (id.) A concept of semio-
sphere, inspired by the terms ‘biosphere’ and ‘noosphere’ 
by means of Vladimir Vernadsky, was discussed in detail in 
the book “Universe of the Mind: A Semiotic Theory of Cul-
ture”, written by Juri Lotman (1990), with an introduction 
done by Umberto Eco.
Donald Favareau (2002), philosopher and linguist, in his 
article on the neurosemiotic emergence of intersubjectiv-
ity, argues that apart from the outside world, the interior, 
as “properly seen, body, brain, mind and cells, are but lev-
els of the same one endlessly interacting complex system - 
and if we can view them or treat them as distinct, it is more 
a testament to our own particular species-specific Lebens-
welt, whereby we  conceptually carve out of the sensory 
plenum of experience, elements of quality or iconicity 
(firstness), elements of relation or indexicality (second-
ness), and elements of synthesis or mediation (thirdness).” 
(Favareau, 2002) Favareau endorses a trichotomic set of 
categories defined by the philosopher Charles Peirce – 
firstness (I), secondness (II) and thirdness (III) –, appointing 
thus a pragmatic body’s observation. These phenomeno-
logical sign categories in Peirce depend of, respectively, (I) 
a sign of itself, the thing-in-itself, without reference to any 
other, (II) a sign representing its object that indicates, a re-
lative nature of the sign to a second object, whether a law 
or a third party, and (III) a sign that represents its object in 
relation to its interpretant. After analyzing the concepts 
of biosphere and semiosphere, in how different spheres 
can constitute a “triadically flowing biosemiosphere” (Mer-
rell, 2001), to this statement of Merrell it would be added 
the noosphere, foreseeing this way these three levels, i.e., 
biosphere (the naturality of life, the lived aspect), semio-
sphere (of relations, the perceived aspect) and noosphere 
(the construct mind, the conceived aspect), in line with the 
categories Peirce (firstness, secondness, thirdness) and 
thus establishing a space of continuum semiotics, real or 
virtual.
7. Sign’s trichotomy
Criticism of the sign definition, existing in all Latin genera-
tions since St. Augustine, becomes explicit in John Poin-
sot, i.e., Friar John of St. Thomas (originally, João de São 
Tomás), considered by the semioticians John Deely (Deely, 
1995; Deely, Powell, & Thomas, 1985), and Anabela Gra-
dim (Gradim, 1998), as the author of Semiotics’ first treaty, 
designating it as “Tractatus de Signis” (in 1632). Poinsot 
described that the sign brings “something else beyond 
itself even onto the perception of an organism, which 
is exactly how ideas work within the mind –  they bring 
to perception something more than themselves.” (Deely, 
1995, p. 77) Signs are seen as interfaces that are emit-
ted through the transmission of what happens, in a con-
templative time’s interpretation of the world, carrying the 
expression’s envelope of a rationality. As Peirce described 
it: sign “it is a vehicle conveying into the mind something 
from without. That for which it stands is called object; 
that which it conveys, its meaning; and the idea to which 
it gives rise, its interpretant. The object of representation 
can be nothing but a representation of which the first re-
presentation is the interpretant.” (Peirce, 1978, CP, I:339) 
Describes Deely (2004) that a sign consists of a triadic re-
lation which parts (or elements) are determined by their 
position and role in the relationship, i.e.: “the one in the 
foreground of representing another than itself is deter-
mined to be the representamen or sign-vehicle; the one 
in the position or role of being the represented other is 
determined to be the object signified; and the one in the 
background of that object for or to which the other re-
presentation is made is determined to be the interpretant.” 
(Deely, 2004) In short, a sign-vehicle, or representamen 
(seen as a thirdness, which mediate), is the first that is an 
original triadic relationship with a second, called object 
(seen as a secondness, which relates), to the point of be-
ing able to determine a third, called interpretant (seen as 
a firstness, which assumes quality), to assume the same 
triadic relationship with the object which stands to an-
other object. With this in mind, we will start to unfold the 
cubic model construction, starting by describing the first 
axis, related to the event, and intersect two trichotomies: 
a) representamen + object + interpretant; b) firstness + 
secondness + thirdness. This combination will character-
ize a trichotomy of three aspects: the element as repre-
sentamen, the body-space as an object, and the mind as 
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an interpretant. Each aspect will be defined by correspon-
ding sciences or areas of investigation underlined by re-
searched and appointed philosophies.
8. Element’s trichotomy as representamen
Representation acquisition of a quasi-real version of an 
element’s thing-in-itself depends on the quality of the 
transmission process, so the representamen will assume 
its dependence on the quality of communication. Given it 
through the “Foundations of the Theory of Signs” (in 1938) 
work, philosopher and semiotician Charles William Mor-
ris, set Semiotics grouping it into syntactic, semantic and 
pragmatic. That trichotomic structure became a basis for 
“Communication Theory” by the hand of sociologist and 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas, and with Morris it became 
clear that this trichotomy defined the representation of 
this aspect as representamen, as a deliverance of a thing-
in-itself. Where the syntactic studies the interrelationship 
of signs, without regard to the meaning (an extension of 
firstness), the semantic studies the relationship between 
signs and objects to which they apply (an extension of 
secondness) and the pragmatic studies the relationship 
between the sign system and its interpretant – animal or 
human or other agent – (an extension of thirdness).
9. Representamen’s trichotomies denominations
Following the theme of communication (due to being a 
mediation element), with Peirce’s trichotomy influence in 
mind, anthropologist Paul Kockelman compares the out-
lined work of mathematician Claude Shannon (“A Math-
ematical Theory of Communication”, 1948), founder of 
Information Theory, where he established “three levels 
of comunication: the technical level (qua reproduction 
of signs); the semantic level (qua signification of objects); 
and the effectiveness level (qua creation of interpretants).” 
(Kockelman, 2013) Thus connoting the three aspects with 
the semiotic distinction of Charles Morris in syntactic, 
semantic and pragmatic. Based on its analysis, Shannon 
(1948) defined the following communication characteris-
tics:
a) An information source, which produces a message;
b) A transmitter, which operates on the message in some 
way to produce a signal suitable for transmission over the 
channel;
c) A channel, as the medium on which the signal, carrying 
the information which composes the message, is sent;
d) A receiver, which transforms the signal back to the mes-
sage to be delivered;
e) A destination, for who or which the message was in-
tended.
In his 2013 article “Information is the enclosure of mean-
ing,” Kockelman observed that “before Shannon’s math-
ematical theory of information, Peirce had developed a 
complementary theory of information, which itself was a 
small part of a broader theory of meaning.” (Kockelman, 
2013) Through the description of Shannon’s basis, and giv-
en credit to Mihai Nadin (Nadin, 1986) interesting essay, 
we established a communication process by a signic line 
related to the representamen event, which is composed by 
a communicative pair of elements, thus being semiotically 
characterized as follows:
a) Source and destination, assuming each a quality charac-
teristic, reflects a firstness (of each umwelt), where the 
message is the sign of itself, the thing-in-itself, without 
reference to any other. The introduction to Kant’s (2001, 
p. XV) book argued that the “thing-in-itself”, the noume-
non, the original element, can not be known, it will be 
something a priori. What will happen will be that the un-
derstanding mind will think of it, designating it as a “the 
thing-in-itself thought,” a construct expressed by the 
mind. A noumenon is not directly accessible to observa-
tion, nor to itself;
b) Transmitter and receiver, assuming each a relation char-
acteristic, reflects a secondness, considered as a sign that 
represent its own object which indicates, of a sign’s rela-
tive nature to a second object in the relationship. The idea 
which these aspects assume are of an adapter, an enve-
lope, which involves the representamen;
c) Finally, channel, assuming a mediation characteristic, 
reflects a thirdness, regarded as a sign that represents its 
object in relation to its interpretant in its mediation, as the 
mean by which the representamen communication is laid.
As described as such, we will designate syntactic as ‘nou-
menon’, semantic as ‘envelope’ and pragmatic as ‘channel’ 
(See Table 1).
9. Space’s trichotomy as object
A relationship (an object reflects a relation element) with 
a sign depends on the relativity to that element, whether 
that would be a body, or, particularly, a space. Thus such 
object will assume its dependence on the expression of 
this relationship, an expression of the sense of its referred 
distance, from the individual element to whom a relation-
ship is established. Anthropologist Edward Hall, who by 
noticing into phenomenological perspective and by ob-
serving that “people from different cultures not only speak 
different languages but, what is possibly more important, 
inhabit different sensory worlds,” (Hall, 1990a, p. 2) pro-
posed a neologism – proxemics –, designating it as “a work 
project that describes and compares the different types of 
use that man makes of space.” (Silvano, 2010, p. 67) Pro-
xemic system classification is expressed in 4 parts, or ‘dis-
tances’, based on observations of the interaction of both 
people and animals. Designation of the physical distances 
come as follows:
a) “Intimate distance” (from the center body extending 
equidistantly around 40 cm - values considered for the 
American population in the 60´s): At this particular dis-
tance, the presence of the other is imposed and may even 
become invasive by its impact on the perceptual system. 
(Hall, 1990a, p. 116)
b) “Personal distance” (between 0.4 and 1.2 meters): 
where the term ‘personal distance’ means the distance be-
tween limbs (arm’s length) expressing a space, or “protec-
tive sphere or bubble that an organism maintains between 
itself and others”. (Hall, 1990a, p. 119)
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c) “Social distance” (between 1.2 and 3.6 meters): where 
the “intimate visual detail in the face is not perceived, and 
nobody touches or expects to touch each other unless 
there is special effort.” (Hall, 1990a, p. 121)
d) “Public Distance” (more than 3.6 meters): where “several 
important sensory shifts occur in the transition from per-
sonal and social distances to public distance, which is well 
outside the circle of involvement.” (Hall, 1990a, p. 123)
In terms of distance between the interpretant (namely the 
mind) and representamen it was assumed to consider “inti-
mate distance” as a thirdness, representing a determined 
place; “personal” and “social” distances were considered as 
a secondness, to represent a place in perceptive work; and 
“public distance” was considered as a firstness, being the 
object’s territory not yet perceived by the mind’s construct 
in its sensitive format.
9.1 Object’s trichotomies denominations
Philosopher and sociologist Henri Lefebvre (1991), known 
for introducing the concept of Production of Space as 
an object of study, developed a triple dialectics of social 
space, described in his book “La production de l’espace” 
(1st edition in 1974), consisting of the “space of represen-
tation”, the “spatial practice” and the “representation of 
space.” Where:
a) “Spaces of representation are associated with everyday 
life and to the lived, the clandestine and underground side 
of social life.” (Silvano, 2010, p. 49)
 
Describes Filomena Silvano (2010), citing Lefebvre, that 
space of representation, the “space lived through images 
and symbols that go with it,” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 39) are the 
“inhabitants” and the “users’” space, of those who simply 
inhabit it, so this would be the space in expression of him-
self. As Silvano stated, “space to Lefebvre is lived before 
being perceived.” (Silvano, 2010, p. 49) To this space Lefe-
bvre called “lived” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 40), and will remain 
in this denomination, assuming to be as a firstness.
b) “Spatial practice, which embraces production and re-
production, and the particular locations and spatial sets 
characteristic of each social formation.” (Lefebvre, 1991, 
p. 33)
Silvano points equally that spatial practice would be “each 
member of a given society’s relationship” (Lefebvre, 1991, 
p. 33), reflecting the relation characteristic of secondness. 
To this space we will designate as “perceived.” (Lefebvre, 
1991, p. 40)
c) Representations of space “are tied to the relations of 
production and to the ‘order’ which those relations im-
pose.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 33)
Silvano argues that representation of space would imply 
“the existence of knowledge, signs and specific codes. Ac-
cordingly, the theory reproduces the generative process of 
space,” (Silvano, 2010, p. 48) of space’s meaning construc-
tion where signs are under interpretation – thus this will 
be understood as a thirdness. To this space we will desi-
gnate as “conceived.” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 40)
Therefore, define public distance as ‘lived’, the paired set 
of social and personal distance as ‘perceived’ and the inti-
mate distance as ‘conceived’ (See Table 2).
10. Mind’s trichotomy as interpretant
Sign’s process of interpretation by the mind, which re-
presents its object in relation to its interpretant, depends 
on the state of perception by which the mind assimilates 
the information of that sign. Thus, the interpretant (which 
reflects a quality element) will depend on the perceptual 
development of the acquired information synthesis. As 
done before, by trying to establish a grounded relation, 
we will combine the interpretant with the mind, unfolding 
such aspect relating to the mind’s perception expression, 
revealing a “distance” of such expression development or 
space’s interpretant expression.  
So, assuming that awareness production of something will 
go through various states, or levels, of perception, that can 
densify gradually until an aware perception of a real object 
simulacrum, we researched such premises. Experimental 
results of neuroscientist Philip Merikle about perception 
without awareness, indicated that “stimuli are perceived 
even when observers are unaware of stimuli”, (Merikle, 
Smilek, & Eastwood, 2001) thus exposing the existence of 
a previous perception state before this gradually develop 
into a certain level of consciousness. Koivisto, according to 
his experience, describing the relationship between atten-
tion and consciousness, stated that we “should distinguish 
between different types of attention and different forms 
of consciousness.” (Koivisto, Kainulainen, & Revonsuo, 
2009) Neuropsychologist Marie Vandekerckhove (2009), 
in a project on consciousness as a continuum of states, 
said that the distinction between different states of con-
sciousness becomes gradually relating it to a perception’s 
development levels, identity and memory. Three years an-
ticipating the same dynamic of thought, Overgaard con-
cluded that “reported findings relates to the hypothesis 
that there is more than one perceptual threshold,” (Over-
gaard, Rote, Mouridsen, & Ramsøy, 2006) but goes further 
by arguing that there are different “levels” of awareness, 
thus intending, as in a earlier article, “Is consciousness a 
gradual phenomenon”, by neuroscientist Claire Sergent 
(Sergent & Dehaene, 2004), to “give experimental sup-
port to the thesis that there is a clear transition between 
conscious and unconscious perception.” (Overgaard et 
al., 2006) A few years before, Petra Stoerig conducted 
a research on the functional vision system and levels of 
perception, in which she already suggested “a concept of 
dissociable levels of perception.” (Stoerig & Brandt, 1993) 
And in a survey about intuitive perception, Phan Luu (Luu 
et al., 2010) and his team agreed that the “process of per-
ception requires not only the brain’s receipt of sensory 
data but also the meaningful organization of that data in 
relation to the perceptual experience held in memory,” 
bearing in mind that although it results in a “conscious per-
ception, the perception process is not fully conscious” be-
fore the perception culminates “the initial representation 
of gist may support intuitive judgments about the ongoing 
perceptual process.” (id.)
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As argued, there’s a probable existence of a degree of 
densification and completion of perception. Following this 
perspective, we present a semiotic theoretical unfolding 
of perception, between the situation of thing-in-itself (an 
a priori condition) and an object’s awareness idea given by 
the sign.
a) A priori (apperception, consciousness threshold, traces 
of information presence);
A priori is identified as the most distant perception phase, 
a place of the thing-in-itself of the object presence, a first-
ness territory, when it assumes as a transcendent knowl-
edge (Kant, 2001) or something incorporeal without a 
substantial physical definition. Space beyond the a priori 
degree would turn out to be a territory of mental uncon-
sciousness – will be a place of transcendence. As stated by 
Kant (2001, p. 79), the “nature of the objects themselves 
is completely unknown to us.”
b) Intuition (first indications of information perception, in-
formation appearance);
‘Intuition’ is identified as the “representation that can be 
given before any thought” (Kant, 2001, p. 131), as a feeling 
that carries the appearance of a substance, that is hidden 
and escapes to the consciousness. According to Susi Fer-
rarello, in her article “Intuition and perception in the sixth 
logical investigation of Edmund Husserl,” “intuition seems 
to be posed on an higher state than perception, since it 
seems to translate its Reinheit in perceived datum” (Fer-
rarello, 2010) One could define intuition as a premonition 
of perception to where sensitivity intervenes becoming 
perception into a premonition of understanding, and this 
into an understanding draft, thus embodying cognitive 
awareness substance. 
Philosopher Paul Carus published about and followed very 
closely the work of Charles Peirce, his contemporary and 
also philosopher. Carus as the first editor of “The Monist” 
took upon himself the task of creating a new term that, in 
his view, should take the meaning of Anschauung (trans-
lated nowadays as ‘intuition’), expressed by Kant, “as an 
act of “atlooking” [in German “schauen”, to look], and the 
word “atsight” readily suggested itself. The word “atsight” 
is an exact English equivalent of the German Anschau-
ung. It describes the looking at an object in its immediate 
presence.” (Carus, 1892) In Kant’s perspective “space and 
time (...) are immediately given, they also are Anschauun-
gen.” (id.) Kant always tried to be “very careful to show 
that they are not ideas, not thoughts, not abstractions, 
not generalizations, but that they are as direct data as are 
sense-impressions and he calls the knowledge which man 
has by directly facing the object of knowledge “Anschau-
ung”.” (id.) Kant though anschauung should mean just that, 
“anschauung”, what is apparently the very perception of 
view. As ‘intuition’, the translation still lingers, and Kant 
“is still misunderstood by his opponents no less than by 
those who profess to be his disciples.” (id.) In short, having 
settled this explanation, what results in the sense of sensi-
tivity, in the Kantian concept, is expressed by more or less 
captivation of what’s perceived by a certain contemplative 
degree nominated by the term “anschauung”, “atsight”, or 
rather something that’s a visible imprint but has not yet set 
a concrete perception, it only presents itself present. Thus, 
we will opt, lacking a better translation, for the designation 
‘atsight’.
c) Perception (an idea of information, form (morphē));
That said, ‘perception’ itself would come following, seen as 
the action by which one captures (percipere: per ( “through”) 
+ capere ( “capture”)). The one who clings to the sensation 
of the intuited. As Husserl said: “perception, the perceived 
thing should be immediately given. Here’s the thing be-
fore my eyes that they perceive; I see it and I grab it. But 
perception is simply the living of my subject, the subject 
that perceives it.” (Husserl, 2008, p. 40) Here, for deeper 
guidance, we remark Husserl’s lectures about “continuum 
of the temporal object extensive perception” (Husserl, 
1994) and “spatial extension” perception (Husserl, 1997). 
On the other hand, Locke considered that “perception, the 
first faculty of the spirit that deals with our ideas, is also 
the first and simplest idea we receive through reflection.” 
(Locke, 2010, p. 169) Perhaps mind “reflects” instantly on 
what perceives, mirroring back the reflection of the outer 
space composition. Many phenomena go through into our 
senses affection.
d) Understanding (a notion of information);
‘Understanding’ (“entender” in Portuguese), the action to 
extend into (intendere: in ( “in”) + tendere (“stretch”)), that 
it approaches the element captured by the senses for a 
better observation.
e) Comprehension (densification of information);
‘Comprehension’, the action by which it clings closer (com-
prehendere: com (“together”) + prehendere ( “grab”)), the 
one that into what the interpretant nears almost intimate-
ly before rationalizing on that information. 
The sequence of ‘perception’, ‘understanding’ and ‘com-
prehension’, taken together, describe the coupling move-
ment of information, or reading, of the meaning of an ob-
served object, in mind. Because, to each time, the mind 
‘captures’, ‘approaches’ and ‘clings’ the information that 
the sensitive senses had perception. These listed nouns 
that before were seen as human capabilities now become 
designations of places in, and of, a sort of space.
f) Reason (construction of information);
Finally, it operates, interprets and builds the acquired in-
formation where rationality intervenes, i.e., the making of 
‘reason’. Kant (Kant, 2001, p. XVI) in his “Dialectics” cent-
ers in the faculty of Reason and elaborates an argument to 
support it as the “highest unit of thought.” (id.)
g) Consciousness (perception of itself, the caregiver of 
knowledge).
Reducing the sign to an aware knowledge, into a ‘con-
sciousness’, which engages itself into a sensibility of pre-
sence.
In terms of placement of these names in the relationships 
of space’s relativity, where it mediates between the thing-
in-itself and the interpreter, we set the mind’s trichotomy 
as follows: the a priori and atsight (“intuition”) classifying 
it as firstness; perception, understanding and compre-
hension as secondness; and reason and consciousness as 
thirdness.
If we could present in a conceptual image of the previ-
ous setting, for clarification of a mental structure simu-
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lation, we would use physics notions to produce a visual 
representation of the levels’ relationship from perception 
to consciousness. Looking to and from a perspective of 
a mind-body dichotomy applied to the gravitational field 
idea described in the theory of relativity, we would draw 
it as a three-dimensional view of the mind in a space-time 
surface design, where it would deform in the presence of 
the mass imposed by an element, which represents the 




10.1 Interpretant’s trichotomies denominations
When mind represents a thought of the oniric world, or an 
interpretation of the physical world constructed percep-
tion, deconstructs that world to rebuild its version of the 
perceived. It picks everything up to the smallest discer-
nible meaning element of its actions in the semiosis, in a 
painting of relationships becoming a pictorial act. This act 
of “painting” the mind’s frame, portrayed in the work of 
Deleuze “Pintura. El concepto de diagrama” mentioned by 
José Miranda Justo in the introduction to Deleuze’s The 
Logic of Sense, “occurs when the form is put in relation 
with a force.” (Deleuze, 2011) From this relationship, “the 
place of the forces, results, in Cezannian terms, into a ‘de-
formation’: ‘a deformation, as a pictorial concept, it’s the 
deformation of the form, it’s the form in a way that upon 
it a force it’s exercised’. To this Deleuze called, using Paul 
Klee’s known expression, ‘making visible the invisible’.” 
(id.) The thing-in-itself, which is the something invisible, 
becomes visible and gains such mentioned form by inter-
preting the sign that represents it. Engagement process 
of a painter with the canvas, according to the philosopher 
Gilles Deleuze, can describe the deconstruction and con-
struction through the mind of it perceives.
A person interacts with the environment through affects 
– it becomes an affect and affects its own medium. To 
Spinoza ‘affects’ were transition states, confused in some 
translations with ‘feelings’, and to Deleuze and Guattari 
were considered as continuous changes. Deleuze still 
differentiated affects from percepts, in which he stated 
that affects were “not feelings, they are becomings that 
go beyond the one that passes through them (and that 
comes from another),” they are independent of its sub-
ject, they are something in itself, and that “percepts are 
not perceptions, are clusters of sensations and relation-
ships that survive to those who experience it.” (Deleuze, 
2011, p. 15) By other words that can be translated as cog-
nitive instruments that attach to a feeling, a kind of mo-
mentary cognitive avatar who lives the experience of that 
feeling. However cognitive affectivity is still a process that 
extends beyond body material limits, only felt by the own 
mind’s affect. Through Deleuze’s words, “percept is the 
landscape before man, in the absence of man.” (Deleuze 
& Guattari, 1994, p. 169) Where perception places itself 
in a presentation prior to interpretation. For Henri Berg-
son, Leibniz and Deleuze, the ‘percept’ is assumed as an 
independent perception of the subject. Deleuze said in 
“Qu’est-ce que la philosophie?” that “which is preserved 
in itself it’s the percept or the affect. Even if the material 
didn’t last more than a few seconds, it would give to the 
sensation the power to exist and to keep itself in eternity 
that coexists with this short length of time. [...] The fee-
ling do not become into the material without the material 
entirely passes all inside the sensation, into the percept 
or affect.” (Deleuze, 2011, p. 15) Being then, right away, 
grabbed and processed by comprehension.
As argued by Paul Carus, “sense-impressions are data, 
they are prior to ideas, the latter being constructions made 
out of sense-impressions. Sense-impressions are facts, but 
ideas are of an inferential nature; they are (to use Lloyd 
Morgan’s excellent term) constructs.” (Carus, 1892) We 
opted to replace Deleuze and Guattari’s (1994) designa-
tion of ‘concept’ with the latter. From what was given as a 
whole, parts become as mind’s constructs, which observes 
the transitions between subelements contrasts of each, 
such as depth’s perception, texture, tone, color, frequen-
cy, the space they occupy, and the boundaries that shape 
them.
After this introduction, in terms of positioning, we define 
each element of trichotomy as follows: the a priori and ‘in-
tuition’ (“atsight”) will be called as ‘affect’; perception, un-
derstanding and comprehension as ‘percept’; and reason 
and consciousness as ‘construct’. In correlation with each 
object’s part, ‘construct’ will be a thirdness seen as ‘con-
ceived’, ‘percept’ will be a secondness seen as ‘perceived’, 
and ‘affect’ will be a firstness seen as ‘lived’ (See Table 3).
11. Semiotic cube
Former trichotomy’s descriptions will lay here the basic 
bricks combination for the semiotic cube’s production. 
This cube, that represents the cubic model, will be des-
ignated as a Pragma unit. It will be through this cube that 
the relationship with the perceived information, or object, 
will be achieved (pragma - πρᾶγμα - derives from πράσσω 
- prasso - which means ‘pass through’, ‘achieve’). This per-
ception emulator would occupy every point in an inertial 
system. Such cube will have an adapter role of a sign’s per-
ception at each point, depending on its spatial and tempo-
ral location subjugated to the existing perceptive fractal 
information.
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Table 4 refers to the summary of trichotomies (represen-
tamen, object, interpretant) developed before, and of the 
sensibilities perceptions (time and space) initially men-
tioned. Cube’s final shape will be obtained by unfolding 
Table 6 into what we see in Figure 5 and 6.
Briefly, we can describe that: At an ‘intimate distance’ 
(thirdness) the ‘interpretant’ constructs meaning (a ‘cons-
truct’). A relationship with the ‘object’ is ‘conceived’ and 
the ‘representamen’ is seen as a ‘channel’. At a ‘personal 
distance’ (secondness), or at a ‘social distance’, the ‘inter-
pretant’ attempts to capture the meaning (a ‘percept’). A 
relationship with the ‘object’ is ‘perceived’ and the ‘repre-
sentamen’ acts as an ‘envelope’. At a ‘public distance’ (first-
ness) the ‘interpretant’ feels a premonition of the meaning 
(an ‘affect’). A relationship with the ‘object’ is ‘lived’ and the 
‘representamen’ is seen as a ‘noumenon’.
Because the three phenomenological categories of Peirce 
– firstness, secondness and thirdness – are equivalent, res-
pectively, to the sign-vehicle, i.e., the representamen (R); 
to the sign that represents its object (O) and to the sign 
that represents its object in relation to its interpretant (I), 
the above table can be constructed as follows, referring to 
space’s sensibility (double axes, event and space):
Now we will unfold its respective correspondents into 
each trichotomy of time’s sensibility.
Figure 2. 
Unfolded Cube
Finally, gathering all sections we build the Pragma unit, 




Agrootics (άγρος on “agros”, “field” + “-ɒtɪk” in connota-
tion with “semiotics”) arises from the interpretation of the 
semiosis of spaces, and its contents, from space’s signic 
action, in which it embraces the recognition of mental sen-
sitivity to itself through perception and understanding of 
information actions.
With Agrootics each individual carries the simulacrum re-
presentation of an invisible proxemic sphere, an enveloppe 
corporelle, that would bind the mind, in a kind of augmented 
reality that would express a pseudo-real entity of the mind. 
This representation would give shape to an human umwelt, 
in line with Jakob von Uexküll’s description indicated by 
John Deely, as would also describe Lotman (Lotman & Clark, 
2005) that a “structural heterogeneity of semiotic space 
creates reserves of dynamic processes and represents one 
of the mechanisms for the creation of new information in-
side the sphere,” to where Baudrillard, mentioning Shan-
non’s Hypothesis, would observe a “sphere of information 
that is purely functional.” (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 79)
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Visually Hall’s distances are represented around an indi-
vidual’s sign in parallel with Peirce’s trichotomic categories, 
thereby extending the area of analysis and interaction with 
the object thing-in-itself that will interact with that space. 
In summary:
a) ‘Pragmatic’ (linked to the relationship between umwelt 
and its interpretant), ‘channel’, ‘intimate distance’, ‘con-
ceived’, ‘construct’, ‘reason’ and ‘consciousness’: relates to a 
Thirdness (as a sign that represents its object in relation to 
its interpretant) – which mediates;
b) ‘Semantic ’ (linked to the relationship between the spaces 
and the objects that relate), ‘envelope’, ‘personal distance’ 
– ‘Social distance’, ‘perceived’, ‘percept’, ‘perception’, ‘under-
standing’ and ‘comprehension’: relates to a Secondness (as 
a sign representing your object that indicates the relative 
nature of the sign to a second object) – which relates;
c) ‘Syntactic’ (linked to the interrelation of spaces of signs), 
‘noumenon‘, ‘public distance’, ‘lived’, ‘affect’, ‘atsight’ and ‘a 
priori’’: relates to a Firstness (the representamen, the sign-
vehicle, the thing-in-itself, without reference to any other) 
– which embodies quality or iconicity.
Figure 4. 
Agrootic sphere representation 
- Parallelism of spatial perception
Through Peirce’s phenomenology (last line in Figure 4) an 
analogy was drawn between the upper line (see Figure 4), 
that represents the mind, and Hall’s proxemics (see lower 
lines in Figure 4).  
Figure 5. 
Spatial perception simulacrum
To each simulacrum is related, or connected, a semiotic cube 
(see Figure 6) that represents a general state or characte-
ristic of such subject. In Figure 5 we represent the dynamic 
lines that establish the relationships between the spaces of 
mind (upper line) and body (lower line).
After outlining the surrounding areas, the analysis of an 
interpreter is represented by “projecting” a mental line ap-
proach to the element of focus. Seeing this as just a con-
ceptual example, opened to other constructions of rela-
tionships with the Pragma, at the following figure we have 
the case of the observation of an animal: the space of the 
element ‘dog’ is represented by its signic space (its status, 
its pedigree, its fur, its action, its proximity, its information 
memory about this element and alike) that can be “virtu-
alized” by the Pragma. Signs of each element will appear 
through Peirce’s phenomenological space of your image, 
and under the representation of the Pragma it will assume 
an adapter role, opening up the information tree view for 
the elements, serving, in the example, the second Pragma 
as an adapter/translator of the original ones. Each inter-
preter as an insight, through its Pragma, of the other. At the 
same time each own space interacts and combines (first: 
firstness with firstness).
Detailing the action of a certain Pragma, we proceed by re-
moving the spaces and remaining only with the cube that 
we want to represent.
In this case, for example an observation of a “vehicle”, is 
assumed that the construction of this semiotic process is 
produced through RRR - OOO - III, or:
a) RRR: a representamen in which its definition of the el-
ement (y-axis), space (x-axis) and time (z-axis) are all first-
ness, that is, the definition is presented as a ‘noumenon’, in 
a ‘noumenon’ space and at a ‘noumenon’ time;
b) OOO: an object in which its perception, space and time 
are all secondness, that is, the perception of it is presented 
as ‘perceived’, in ‘perceived’ space and at a ‘perceived’ time;
c) III: an interpretant in which its notion, space and time are 
all thirdness, that is, the notion of it appears as ‘construct’, 
in a ‘construct’ space and at ‘construct’ time.
In other words, as an example of description, could mean 
that an element’s representamen (or thing-in-itself) ac-
quired by the interpreter was perceived momentarily (RRR), 
but because the object was somehow familiar to him (OOO) 
– i.e., it was placed at a social/personal distance –, the com-
prehension of it triggered a memory already established or 
the reasoning on it was eventually easily produced, buil-
ding thus an easy understanding of it (III) from the received 
sign – i.e., the sign, or image, view was a construct –, cor-
responding to the assumptions that made sense to the in-
terpreter. The interpretant construct through its perceived 
object had an atsight noumenon representamen of the ele-
ment’s first presence.
To apply the Agrootic cubic model, first (not as a premise) 
we have to lay around each event (observer and object) the 
spatial perception simulacrum (seen in Figure 5 and detailed 
in Figure 4), and only them we apply the correlation with 
the respective Pragma, doing so for an elected characte-
ristic, or set of characteristics, analysing each event, or ele-
ment, with it and the relationships with others (or itself).
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Figure 6. 
Agrootic process between 2 elements
Figure 7. 
Simplified perceptual process 
between the observer and the object
13. Mind’s expression in space
Information tendency inclines to an escape of the flatland 
– mentioning Edward Tufte (1995) reference’s to Edwin 
A. Abbott’s book (Abbott, 2006) written in 1884 –, which 
two-dimensional view come in form of book pages, pain-
ting canvas, school boards, tablets screens, and also most 
of our thoughts. Digital information begins to live in three-
dimensional spaces and intersects with physical and virtual 
dimensions. Michael Heim stated that maybe “rather than 
control or escape or entertain or communicate, the ultimate 
promise of VR may be to transform, to redeem our aware-
ness of reality.” (Heim, 1993) Thus, unconsciously, perhaps 
we are immersed in this process. The term ‘Virtual Reality’ 
(VR) dates back to “Myron Krueger in the 1960s and to Ivan 
Sutherland and Morton Heilig even earlier.” (id.) Heim des-
cribed that Myron Krueger was a “far-seeing inventor of vir-
tual-reality systems,” having dedicated “his life to bringing 
full freedom of body movement to the interface.“ (id.) With 
the passing years this electronic realm extended to the real, 
and in 1990 a researcher from Boeing, Tom Caudell (Lee, 
2012), introduced the term ‘Augmented Reality’ (AR). AR is 
generally an evolution of the extra necessities of the virtual 
reality’s space, becoming more than virtual by its juxtaposi-
tion to the real world, as if our mental information about a 
given object assumed a real external representation in rela-
tion to our mind, and thus briefly turning the real space in 
an extension of the mind, simulating a hyperreality of cogni-
tive sensitivity. Augmented reality is reflected as a mediator 
of worlds, as its own reality, increasing the perception of 
reality in real time, and also of meaning’s semantic context 
with the world that surrounds us in a quasi-hallucinogenic 
state in overlapped imaginaries to the real world. Agrootics 
easily meets with AR by its acting form, categorizing itself 
as an augmented reality, but, in this case, of the mind itself.
Our necessity to know each other individually, our necessity 
to manifest ourselves, and to express our sense of things 
and how we perceive reality through our own eyes, always 
looks for a way to expose the mental ideas into material 
ones. There are other ways to think, to thought proces-
sing, that are imagetic visually realistic (in an associative 
and non-linear mind), musically and mathematically, and of 
auditory perception. One of those cases is observed, like 
an augmented reality, an ability to think in or with images. 
This process mirrors in the case of Temple Grandin (2009), 
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diagnosed with autism, which publicly shared the function-
ing perception of her own mind. It was in the sense of refi-
ning this type of formulation, of the hypothesis of an autis-
tic cognition of “thinking in pictures”, that Maithilee Kunda 
(Kunda & Goel, 2010), a researcher in artificial intelligence 
and cognitive systems, concluded that “given the existence 
of considerable evidence in line with the hypothesis, the 
idea that certain individuals with autism may “think visu-
ally” should be taken seriously as a cognitive model and re-
ceive more focused and sustained attention in behavioral 
and neurobiological experiments.” (id.)
Human beings have tried to express, and represent in many 
ways, their mental forms of information projecting them in 
their own space, sometimes through computer simulations 
in virtual environments, or by non-touchable holography. In 
accordance with the user’s point of view augmented reality 
comes to trigger an engagement of him with given informa-
tion through visual interaction, thus providing another pers-
pective about a service or a product reaching customers po-
tential through mixed information presentation format with 
reality itself. Agrootics, in part, is seen as a result of the ne-
cessity of understanding the technological philosophy be-
hind augmented realities, and its imagetic view of our minds 
combined with real space and reality itself. Nevertheless, in 
the end, it’s all about us.
14. Technology as mind’s extension
We may have reached a point where the mind needs some-
thing to snatch the limiting intricacies of a skull, feeling that 
is more than the cocoon which inhabits and animates. In this 
sense, the technological evolution has complemented un-
consciously this transposition of a former emptiness. In its 
Techgnosis (in 1998) writer Erik Davis remarked that “mo-
dems unscrewed the Huxley’s mental ‘reductive valve’ and 
let in an unlimited mind (Mind at Large) network connected. 
(...) Computers and electronic media are ‘connecting’ to eve-
ryone and cyberspace it’s taking shape as a changing virtual 
landscape of a merged collective mind.” (Huxley, 2008, p. 
24) Kerckhove said, citing Michael Benedikt, that with “cy-
berspace, a totally new space it’s opened by life on earth 
own complexity: a new hive for a realm that lies between 
the two worlds. Cyberspace becomes a place for conscious-
ness itself.” (de Kerckhove, 2001, p. 15) A place where the 
mind becomes visible, where social networks are “suppor-
ted by a technological extension, a technological surrogate 
of the central nervous system, as first noted by McLuhan.” 
(de Kerckhove, 2001, p. 20)
According to Gilbert Ryle, philosopher and critic of Carte-
sian dualism, by advocating no distinction in the mind-body 
relationship, the mental processes are intelligent acts. In 
1951, Ryle introduced the notion of “ghost in the machine” 
with The Concept of Mind (Ryle, 2009), where he wrote 
that “minds are not parts of a clock, are just pieces of a no 
clock.” (Ryle, 2009, p. 20) This “ghost in the machine” was 
also discussed in “the ghost in the atom” (Davies & Chal-
mers, 1989), where Paul Davies joined some interviews 
with known scientists about quantum physics, arguing that 
the concrete understanding of the “spirit of the machine” 
is necessary to understand the discussion of the “ghost in 
the atom” (Davies & Chalmers, 1989, p. 52) itself. On the 
path to a better understanding of mind-body relationship 
neurosurgeon Sunil K. Pandya (2011) cites the neurologist 
Krishnamoorthy, remarking that mind’s operations is simi-
lar to computers, where it becomes ‘made in the image of’: 
“The mind… is a virtual entity, one that reflects the workings 
of the neural networks, chemical and hormonal systems 
in our brain.” (id.) This form of putting in perspective the 
mind’s shape as an information processing system, in which 
the mind is seen as a computing machine, has analogy in 
the “computational theory of mind” proposed in 1961 by 
mathematician and philosopher Hilary Putnam.
In fact, considering the increasingly complex online uni-
verse, we do not know if reality mimics the mental dimen-
sion or otherwise, or both simultaneously, however, human 
ecology is been having a parallel analogy with life itself. We 
are becoming the morphic space of relationships that we 
have established: spaces and territories to which we are 
daily connected in its constancy will define our perception 
limits. We start to extend us in virtual spaces to mentally 
evade from cubicular and urban spaces. In the sense of the 
body connection with technologies, mathematician and 
researcher Frieder Nake, in his article “Human-computer 
interaction viewed as the pseudo-communication” (Nake 
& Grabowski, 2001), considers semiotics as “fundamental 
to an understanding of human-computer interaction, and 
all computer artifacts.” (id.) Supporting this argument Kech-
eng Liu (2000) points out that “understanding signs should 
contribute to our perception of information and informa-
tion systems.” (Liu, 2000, p. 1) Thus, with the argument that 
semiotics could be presented “as a framework for under-
standing and designing computer systems as sign systems,” 
(Andersen, 1992) Peter Andersen through its “computer 
semiotics” (1992) pointed out “all levels of a system can be 
treated semiotically” (id.) having the principle that the “sys-
tem interface is (...) is an obvious example of a sign-based 
computer.” (id.) These former works are indicative of the im-
portance for the argument of semiotics introduction as the 
adapter of mind with this cybersymbiosis and, overall, with 
social communications.
Interaction of people with extended realities, following 
the quality to transcend the mind of each one, provided by 
technological advances and the expansion of the internet 
connection, is transforming societies perspective which 
possess a reality of their own. Jean Baudrillard (1994) ar-
gued that our society is replacing all reality with signs, thus 
assuming a semiotic nature, and consequently our human 
experience is becoming a simulation of reality. Perhaps in 
the near future evolution of the human species reaches a 
point where it no longer needs technological tools and will 
connect its mental form with its own “ghost” in some way. 
Yet, for now, this is a mere thought, an imaginative wish, 
and Agrootics serves as replacement for the lack of such 
connection.
15. Closure
This meaning interpretation method, Agrootics, is under-
stood as a proposal of a dimensional emulator of mind’s 
hinted augmented reality. A model of meaning construction 
is presented that’s characterized by lines of thought about 
the sensibility of space. This way of observing the world 
can maybe offer a paradigm shift in how we look, how we 
understand each other, and visually perceive space and its 
elements. This article result combines related research in 
Semiotics, Anthropology, Sociology, Neuroscience, Com-
munication Science, Electronics and Informatics. Conjugat-
ing Agrootics with RA, and overall with informatics, it might 
boost a better understanding of information meaning and 
communication quality. In general, it might offer, at least, 
a different perspective on interpreting an event element in 
relation to its environment, and gives us transcendence in 
being. After all, we all are perceived, and emotionally con-
structed, in a three dimensional space.
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